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Three subjects in their relationship
We have seen that, in acknowledging the divine beginning in general as the extant with
[its]
unconditional content, it is necessary to admit in that principle the presence of three subjects, inseparable
[and]
of one substance, each of whom
in his own
way is related to one and the same unconditional essence, in his own way possesses one and the same unconditional content.
The first is the unconditional Prime Beginning
[First Cause], spirit as self-extant, i.e., the immediately-extant One as the absolute substance. The second is the eternal and adequate manifestation or expression, the essential Word of the first. And the third is the Spirit, returning until himself and thereby completing the circle of the divine being: the Spirit actuated or completed—the Holy Spirit.
Such are these three subjects in their interrelationship. Their distinction, as we have seen, is logically conditioned first of all by the necessary three-fold relation of the extant One to his general essence or content. That relation we were able to present at the start only in a most general logical form (as being-in-itself, being-for-itself;
and being-with-itself);
but now, when the extant One has already been determined for us as three separate subjects, his three-fold relation to the essence can be represented in a more definite and concrete manner, which, in turn, will lead to a more meaningful definition of the three subjects.
The trinity of God is incomprehensible to the mind
However, there is a certain sense in which we must acknowledge the triunity of God as completely inconceivable by
[human]
reason, and it is as follows:
[the divine]
triunity, being the actual and substantial
[inter-]
relation of the living subjects, the inner life of the extant One, cannot be covered, completely expressed, or exhausted by any definitions of the mind:
[definitions]
which by their very meaning, always express only the general and the formal but not the essential and material aspect of being;
all the definitions and categories of reason are only the expressions of the objectivity or comprehensibility of being, but not of its own inner subjective being and life. But it is obvious that
such
incomprehensibility, derived from the very nature of reason in general as a formal capacity, cannot be ascribed to the limitation of the human reason;
for every reason, no matter to whom it may belong, as reason is able to perceive only the logical aspect of what exists, its concept (in Greek: λόγος), or the general relation
[of the particular]
to the whole, but in no way that
[particular]
existing
[entity]
in its direct, unitary, and subjective actuality. Furthermore, from this it is clear that not only the life of the divine being appears
in this sense
to be incomprehensible, but the life of any creature
[in general];
for no being
[regarded]
as such is exhaustively expressed by its formal objective aspect or by its concept;
as an extant, it necessarily has its inner subjective side which constitutes the very act of its existence, in which it is something unconditionally unitary and unique, something inexpressible, and from this point of view it always represents something foreign to reason, something that cannot enter its sphere, something irrational.10
10
Irrational not in the sense of being without reason but in the sense of not being subject to reason, incommensurate with it;
for senselessness is a contradiction of concepts,
[and]
consequently belongs to the domain of reason, is judged and condemned by it;
while that aspect of being of which we are speaking is outside the limits of reason and, consequently, can be neither reasonable nor senseless;
in the same manner as, for example, the taste of lemon cannot be either white or black.
Thus Divinity in Heaven and a blade of grass on earth are equally inconceivable and equally conceivable by reason: one as well as the other, in its general being, as a concept, constitutes an object of pure thought, is wholly subject to logical definitions, and in this sense is fully intelligible and comprehensible for reason;
yet both in their own being,
as existant but not as objects of thought, are something greater than a concept, lie beyond the limits of the rational as such;
and in that sense,
[they]
are impermeable or incomprehensible for reason.
The truth of the trinity is clear from the logical side
Returning to the truth of the triunity, we must say that it is not only fully comprehensible in its logical aspect but that it is based upon the general logical form which defines every actual being;
and if this form in application to Divinity seems to be more difficult to comprehend than when it is applied to other objects
[of thought], this is not because the divine life in its formal, objective aspect is less subject to logical definitions than anything else (there is no ground for such supposition), but only because the domain of the divine being is not an habitual object of our thoughts. Therefore, for a better grasp of the form of the triunity, it is necessary to apply it to a being that is closer, more familiar to us than the divine being;
having understood the general form of triunity in a finite being known to us directly, we can then without difficulty develop also those variations of the form
[of triunity]
which are conditioned by the peculiarities of that new content to which this form must be applied in defining the absolute being. In this respect, the analogies which point to the formula of triunity in the beings and phenomena of the finite world, have an actual value for the truth of the triunity of God, not as proofs of it—for it is proved or deduced in a purely logical way from the very idea of Divinity—but as examples which facilitate its comprehension. But for this purpose it is not enough to indicate merely the presence of a three-fold character coextant with
[its]
oneness in some object, as has been habitually done by the theologians who maintain the view-point of the mechanistic thinking (and it should be noted that such external analogies merely outlined the supposed incomprehensibility of this truth);
for a real analogy it is necessary that triunity appear as an internal law of the very life of a being. It is necessary, in the first place, that triunity have an essential significance for that object, that it be its essential form, and not an external accidental attribute;
and, secondly, it is necessary that in this form triunity follow from the unity and the unity from die trinity, so that these two momenti would be in a logical interconnection, would internally condition each other. Therefore the domain of spiritual being alone is suitable for such analogies, as one that bears the law of its life within itself. I have already shown above the general triunity in the life of the human spirit
[taken]
in its whole scope;
deserving of attention are also other, more particular and definite, analogies in the same domain,
[and]
of these I shall here mention two.
The first was originally pointed out with full clarity by Leibnitz, and later on played a considerable part in German idealism. Our reason, says Leibnitz, necessarily represents an inner triunity when it reflects upon itself, in self-consciousness. Here it appears as three in one and one in three. Indeed, in reason which
[in reflecting upon itself]
recognizes or understands itself, the knower (subject)
and the cognized (object)
are one and the same, namely, one and the same reason;
but the very act of cognition and consciousness, the act which unites the cognized with the knower (subject and object)
is nothing other than the same reason in action;
and, as the first two momenti exist only with the third one and in it, so likewise the third exists only in their presence and in them;
so that here we actually have a certain indivisible trinity of one essence.
Another analogy, which is less known although it is still keener, is the one pointed out by St. Augustine in his
Confessions. It seems that for some reason it has attracted much less attention than other examples of triunity in various objects, cited in abundance by the same St. Augustine in his book
de Trinitare, which belong to the same external and irrelevant analogies of which I spoke above. In the
Confessions, St. Augustine states the following: In our spirit we must distinguish its simple immediate being (esse), its knowing (scire), and its willing (velle);
these three acts are identical not only by their content, in so far as the extant one knows and wills himself;
but their unity goes far deepen each of them contains in itself die other two in their own characteristic quality, and, consequently, each internally contains already the whole fullness of the triune spirit. Indeed, in the first place, I am but not simply am—I am the one who knows and wills (sum sciens a volens);
consequently, here my being as such already contains in itself both knowledge and will;
secondly, if I know then I know, or am conscious of my being as well as of my will, I know or am conscious of the fact that I am and that I will (scio me esse et velle);
thus here also, in knowledge, as such, or under the form (in the attribute)
of knowledge, both being and will are contained;
thirdly and finally I wish myself yet not simply myself, but myself as existing and knowing, I will my existence and knowledge (volo me esse a scire);
consequently, the form of the will also contains in its attribute being and knowledge. In other words, each of these three fundamental acts of the spirit is completed in itself by the other two, and thus becomes individualized into a full triune being.
This consideration approaches the truth of the triunity of God very closely and can serve as a natural transition to the further development of this truth, namely, in regard to the specific individual relations of the three divine subjects to the single essence or idea, which they actualize and in which they themselves become concretely realized.
See also
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