The world is now entering its third currency war in less than one hundred years. Whether it ends tragically as in CWI [Currency War I] or is managed to a soft landing as in CWII [Currency War II] remains to be seen. What is clear is that – considering the growth since the 1980s of the national economies, money printing and leverage through derivatives – this currency war will be truly global and fought on a more massive scale than ever. Currency War III will include both official and private players. This expansion in size, geography and participation exponentially increases the risk of collapse. Today the risk is not just of devaluation of one currency against another or a rise in the price of gold. Today the risk is the collapse of the monetary system itself – a loss of confidence in paper currencies and a massive flight to hard assets. Given these risks of catastrophic failure, Currency War III may be the last currency war – or, to paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, the war to end all currency wars.

Peter Schiff: You portray recent monetary history as a series of currency wars – the first being 1921-1936, the second being 1967-1987, and the third going on right now. This seems accurate to me. In fact, my father got involved in economics because he saw the fallout of what you would call Currency War II, back in the '60s. What differentiates each of these wars, and what is most significant about the current one?

James Rickards: Currency wars are characterized by successive competitive devaluations by major economies of their currencies against the currencies of their trading partners in an effort to steal growth from those trading partners.

While all currency wars have this much in common, they can occur in dissimilar economic climates and can take different paths. Currency War I (1921-1936) was dominated by a deflationary dynamic, while Currency War II (1967-1987) was dominated by inflation. Also, CWI ended in the disaster of World War II, while CWII was brought in for a soft landing, after a very bumpy ride, with the Plaza Accords of 1985 and the Louvre Accords of 1987.

What the first two currency wars had in common, apart from the devaluations, was the destruction of wealth resulting from an absence of price stability or an economic anchor.

Interestingly, Currency War III, which began in 2010, is really a tug-of-war between the natural deflation coming from the depression that began in 2007 and policy-induced inflation coming from Fed easing. The deflationary and inflationary vectors are fighting each other to a standstill for the time being, but the situation is highly unstable and will "tip" into one or the other sooner rather than later. Inflation bordering on hyperinflation seems like the more likely outcome at the moment because of the Fed's attitude of "whatever it takes" in terms of money-printing; however, deflation cannot be ruled out if the Fed throws in the towel in the face of political opposition.

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Peter: In your book, you lay out four possible results from the present currency war. Please briefly describe these and which one do you feel is most likely and why.

James: Yes, I lay out four scenarios, which I call "The Four Horsemen of the Dollar Apocalypse."

The first case is a world of multiple reserve currencies with the dollar being just one among several. This is the preferred solution of academics. I call it the "Kumbaya Solution" because it assumes all of the currencies will get along fine with each other. In fact, however, instead of one central bank behaving badly, we will have many.

The second case is world money in the form of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). This is the preferred solution of global elites. The foundation for this has already been laid and the plumbing is already in place. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would have its own printing press under the unaccountable control of the G20. This would reduce the dollar to the role of a local currency, as all important international transfers would be denominated in SDRs.

The third case is a return to the gold standard. This would have to be done at a much higher price to avoid the deflationary blunder of the 1920s, when nations returned to gold at an old parity that could not be sustained without massive deflation due to all of the money-printing in the meantime. I suggest a price of $7,000 per ounce for the new parity.

My final case is chaos and a resort to emergency economic powers. I consider this the most likely because of a combination of denial, delay, and wishful thinking on the part of the monetary elites.

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Peter: How long do you think Currency War III will last?

James: History shows that Currency War I lasted 15 years and Currency War II lasted 20 years. There is no reason to believe that Currency War III will be brief. It's difficult to say, but it should last 5 years at least, possibly much longer.